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Abstract 
The transition from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) has shifted the policy debate from growth to ‘quality of growth’ (QG). We 
explore a new dataset on QG by the IMF and classify 93 developing countries for the period 
1990-2011 in terms of Hopefuls, Contenders and Best Performers. The aims are as follows: (i)  
to depict the contradiction between high-growth and poor social welfare and (ii) to assess the 
influence of education and health spending on the QG. We use quantile regressions to 
articulate least and best QG performers. Two key findings emerge. First,  31 of the 33 
countries in the Hopefuls category are in SSA. Second, the effect of health is decreasingly 
positive from Hopefuls to Best Performers, while the impact of education is increasingly 
positive. As a main policy implication, it would benefit countries in SSA to invest more in 
health relative to education now, but decrease such health  expenditure and increase education 
spending as the economies in the sub-region make the transition from Hopeful to Contenders 
and finally to Best Performers in terms of ‘quality of growth’.   
 
JEL Classification: O40; O57; I10; I20; I32 
Keywords: Quality of growth; Development; Education; Health 
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1.  Introduction  
‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 
1955). In the transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), the policy debate has been shifting from growth to growth 
quality. The relevance of the underlying policy debate has been fuelled by the April 15
th
 2015 
publication of World Development Indicators which revealed that poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (Asongu & 
Kodila-Tedika, 2015; Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 2015) in spite of (i) over two decades 
of growth resurgence that began in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015)  and (ii) the sub-region 
hosting seven of the ten fastest growing economies in the world (Asongu & Rangan, 2015). 
According to the narrative, about 45 percent of countries  were off-track from attaining the 
MDGs poverty target.  
Some indicators for measuring inclusive growth have been proposed in recent 
literature. The most notable to the best of our knowledge is  from Anand et al. (2013) and 
Mlachila et al. (2014). The former which accounts for inequality is drawn from the literature 
documenting the imperative for inclusive growth to mitigate poverty in a sustainable manner 
(Kraay, 2004; Berg et al., 2011ab).  Conversely, to relative pro-poor growth (Dollar & Kraay, 
2002), these authors adopt the concept of absolute pro-poor growth in line with Ravallion and 
Chen (2003). The former argues that growth is inclusive on the condition that it reduces 
inequality with more equalizing income distribution that benefits the poor while the latter 
considers inclusive growth as growth that benefits the poor in absolute terms. According to 
Anand et al. (2013), the alternative or relative concept could affect both rich and poor 
households with unfavourable or sub-optimal externalities. Their definition of inclusiveness 
and understanding of inclusive growth entail features like: market protection, employment 
transitions, equity and equal opportunities. In this light, their measurement of inclusive 
growth encompasses growth that is increasing with economic expansion factoring-in inter 
alia: productivity, increasing investment and equal employment opportunities.   
The latter or Mlachila et al. (2014) have drawn on the former (Anand et al., 2013) as 
well as a combination of previous definitions, concepts and measurements of pro-poor growth 
to  provide a new measurement called the Quality of Growth Index (QGI). The new index 
which builds on  Ianchovichina and Gable (2012) and the Commission on Growth and 
Development (2008) is based on a current stream in the literature providing evidence on 
‘immiserizing growth’ that is associated with growing unemployment, poverty and inequality 
in regions like sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Ola-David & Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2014; Dollar et 
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al., 2013; Dollar & Kraay, 2002; Martinez & Mlachila, 2013). The GQI conceives ‘inclusive 
growth’ to be ‘pro-poor growth’ that is durable, high and socially-friendly. Hence, some 
important dimensions critical for ‘growth quality’ include increasing productivity, strength, 
sustainability, stability, poverty mitigation and better living standards. The present study 
focuses on extending Mlachila et al. (2014)  to integrate social dimensions in  the intrinsic 
measurement of growth.  
But before we show how Mlachila et al. (2014) is relevant to the present line of 
inquiry, it is first of all imperative to (i) provide a linkage between stylized facts on the 
relationship between Sub-Saharan Africa’s extreme poverty tragedy and the QGI and (ii) 
discuss why social welfare in health and education are reducing the QGI in SSA. Given that 
growth in the sub-continent has fundamentally been driven by resource-rich countries 
(Asongu, 2015), we use some case studies of resource-rich countries to substantiate the 
narrative. We consider the examples of Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Gabon 
used by Ndikumana and Boyce (2012) and compare with corresponding ‘quality of growth’ 
performance from Mlachila et al. (2014).  
On the first point, the GQI measure by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows 
a significant deterioration in the rankings of the underlying countries during the sampled 
period (1990-2011) (Mlachila et al., 2014). In essence, based on a comparative examination of 
93 developing countries during four non-overlapping periods (1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-
2004 and 2005-2011) the countries under consideration have seen their quality of growth 
consistently deteriorate, notably: (i) 58
th
, 61
st
, 67
th
 and  69
th
 for Gabon; (ii) 59
th
, 70
th
, 74
th
 and   
84
th
 for the Congo Republic and (iii) 76
th
, 73
rd
, 76
th
 and 88
th
 for Equatorial Guinea.  
With regard to the second point, consistent with Ndikumana and Boyce (2012), 
whereas Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo are in the club of Africa’s 
wealthiest countries with respective overall rankings of 15
th
, 2
nd
 and 5
th
 and corresponding per 
capita incomes of $1,253, $8,649 and $4,176, they are also among the poorest in terms of 
educational and health amenities. Moreover, while these nations have been blessed with an 
abundance of oil reserves, with respective ranks of 10
th
, 7
th
 and 8
th
, their citizens are living 
with lamentable poverty standards
1
. According to the narrative, they lack basic social 
facilities like drinkable water, elementary schools, good sanitation and health care. For 
instance, when it comes to the vaccination of the population against measles or immunisation 
against the disease, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon rank third- and second-to-the last with 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that the GDP per capita measurements from Ndikumana and Boyce (2012) are not 
updated.   
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51and 55 percent respectively. The odds of a child celebrating his/her fifth birthday in 
Equatorial Guinea are higher compared with the average for SSA.  
 In light of the above characteristics of high-growth countries, the QGI determinants 
documented by Mlachila et al. (2014) could be improved to incorporate at least two 
dimensions (i) the Hopeful status in terms of quality of growth performance and (ii) poor 
social conditions. First, while the underlying study has documented seven fundamental 
features, we focus on the time-consistent growth quality performance characteristics that are 
highlighted but not exploited
2
. These are: Hopefuls, Contenders and Best Performers in 
growth quality. We extrapolate countries corresponding to Hopefuls and discover that almost 
all members of this category are in SSA. As shown in Table 1, with the exception of Yemen 
and Pakistan, 31 of the 33 countries from this category are from SSA, which is broadly 
consistent with the 2015 World Bank publication.  Second, given the crucial role of the 
socially-friendly feature in the composition of the QGI, we decompose the social spending 
variable into its health and educational components in order to (i) emphasise the welfare 
dimension articulated in the stylized facts and (ii) provide more room for policy implications.  
On the methodological front, instead of examining the determinants of  the mean of 
the dependent variable as in the underling study, we assess the determinants throughout the 
conditional distributions of the QGI. The intuition for this extension is that determinants could 
vary across high-QGI and low-QGI countries such that blanket policies are inefficient unless 
they are contingent on initial levels of QGI and tailored differently across low-QGI and high-
QGI countries. Quantile Regressions (QR) are used for this purpose. This empirical strategy 
also enables us to go beyond the superficial sign-reporting of estimated coefficients of 
determinants of the QGI. Hence, in the interpretation of results, we engage the magnitude of 
coefficients across identified categories and specifications. The research question addressed is 
as follows: how does welfare spending affect the quality of growth when existing levels of 
quality of growth matter? 
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 3, while Section 4 concludes with 
implications and future research directions.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 The features are provided in Figure 4  and Figures 2-3. We shall employ ‘underlying study’ and Mlachila et al. 
(2014) interchangeably throughout the study.  
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Table 1: Categorization of countries  
    
Categories Panels Countries Number 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
 
 
 
Hopefuls  
“Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Central African 
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, The Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, 
Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Swaziland, Chad, Togo, Uganda, Yemen, Congo 
Democratic Republic”. 
 
 
 
33 
   
 
Contenders  
“Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Iran, Lao 
PDR, Morocco, Mongolia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nepal, 
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uzbekistan, Zambia”. 
 
16 
   
 
 
 
 
Best Performers 
“Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Brazil, 
Botswana, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Algeria,  
Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Moldova, Mexico, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Poland, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, El Salvador, Syria, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
South Africa”. 
 
 
 
44 
    
Sources: Mlachila et al. (2014) and  the Authors’. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 93 developing countries with data for the period 1990-2011 
from Mlachila et al. (2014). The dataset which is in the public domain consists of four non-
overlapping intervals: 1990-1994; 1995-1999; 2000-2004 and 2005-2011. Therefore the data 
average is according to the intervals provided by Mlachila et al. (2014).  Computation of the 
QGI is based on data from a plethora of sources, namely: Sala-i-Martin (2006), Barro and Lee 
(2010), United Nations(UN) COMTRADE database, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and  
World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
 Consistent with the motivation of this study, the dependent variable is the QGI 
whereas welfare and/or social spending indicators are education and health expenditure. The 
QGI is a composite (arithmetic mean) indicator of sub-indexes that capture the ‘growth 
nature’ aspect and the ‘desirable social outcomes’ aspect of inclusive development3. 
‘Education spending’ is defined as public resources allocated to education as percent of GDP 
while ‘health spending’ is defined as public resources allocated to heath as percent of GDP. 
                                                 
3
 We invite the interested reader to gain more insights into the construction of the dependent variable in Mlachila 
et al. (2014) because engaging the construction of the dependent variable would be a repetition of what is already 
covered by Mlachila et al. (2014). 
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It should be noted that, contrary to the underlying study, we have decomposed social 
spending into its health and educational components for the purpose of this study. The control 
variables defined in Appendix 1 include: government stability, inflation, private domestic 
credit, foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances, foreign aid, rule of law and quality of 
bureaucracy. Government stability is an index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability 
of government to stay in office and to carry out its declared program(s). The higher the index, 
the more stable the government. Inflation is based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Credit 
to the private sector is credit offered by banks to the private sector as a percent of GDP.  
Foreign direct investment refers to net inflows of foreign direct investments, as percent of 
GDP. Remittances refer to workers' remittances and compensation of employees (percent of 
GDP), calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of employees and 
migrants' transfers. The rule of law is an index assessing the strength and the impartiality of 
the legal system, as well as the popular observance of the law. The index ranges from 0 to 6, 
with a higher value of the index reflecting a higher institutional quality. Quality of 
bureaucracy is the Index of the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy ranging 
from 0 to 4. The higher the index, the stronger the quality of the bureaucracy. 
  The control variables employed are broadly in line with Anand et al. (2013) in the 
inclusive growth literature. With the exception of inflation, which we expect to reduce quality 
of growth when it is high owing to diminishing purchasing power, other control variables are 
expected, for the most part to display positive signs. In essence, whereas high inflation 
mitigates growth quality, inflation that is low and stable is positive for income-equalization 
(Asongu, 2013a) and stimulation of investment to boost economic growth (Asongu, 2013a). 
This is fundamentally because high inflation creates uncertainty due to growing ambiguity 
and investors have been documented to prefer less ambiguous economic strategies (Le Roux 
& Kelsey, 2016ab). On the positive indicators, they have been substantially documented in 
the bulk of inclusive growth literature (Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Barro & Lee, 2000; Calderon & 
Servén, 2004; Levine, 2005; Hausmann et al., 2007; IMF, 2007; Mishra, et al., 2011; Anand 
et al., 2012; Seneviratne &  Sun, 2013; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016ab).  
 We devote some space to engaging the highlighted literature in detail. Consistent with 
the IMF (2007) and Anand et al. (2013), human capital, structural change and macroeconomic 
stability are relevant pro-growth determinants in developing countries. While structural 
change entails globalisation (FDI and trade), human capital and macroeconomic stability 
embody, inter alia: educational levels, technological change and fixed investment. Other 
structural and macroeconomic features essential for the growth process are inflation and 
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output volatility (Dollar & Kraay, 2003; Barro & Lee, 2010), finance (Levine, 2005); 
infrastructural development (Calderon & Servén, 2004; Seneviratne & Sun, 2013); 
development of value chains (Hausmann et al., 2007; Anand, et al., 2012) and production 
modernization (Mishra et al., 2011). The summary statistics are presented in Appendix 2 
whereas the correlation matrix is in Appendix 3. From the summary statistics we observe that 
(i) the means are comparable and (ii) the variables exhibit a substantial degree of variation, 
hence we can be confident that reasonable estimated relationships would emerge.  It is for the 
purpose of having comparable variables that some indicators are presented in logarithms.  
The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. After 
a preliminary assessment, it is apparent that covariates do not have a very high degree of 
substitution.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
 Consistent with the motivation of the study, we adopt Quantile regression (QR). The 
QR technique consists of assessing the determinants of growth quality throughout the 
conditional distributions of the dependent variable. That is from low-QGI to high-QGI 
countries.  It yields parameters estimated at various thresholds in the conditional distributions 
of the QGI (Koenket & Hallock, 2001). This is in line with the underlying literature on 
conditional determinants (Billger & Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2013b) which is focused on 
investigating if initial levels of the dependent variable matter in the effects of underlying 
determinants.  
 Mlachila et al. (2014) reported estimated parameters at the conditional mean of quality 
of growth. Whereas mean impacts are important, we improve the underlying study by 
employing the QR estimation strategy to account for initial quality of growth levels. In 
essence, while Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for instance may assume that the QGI and error 
terms are normally distributed, the QR is not based on this assumption. In essence, with QR, 
parameter estimates are derived at multiple points of the conditional distributions of quality of 
growth (Koenker & Bassett, 1978). The QR estimation strategy is increasingly being 
employed in development literature, inter alia in: health (Asongu, 2014), corruption (Billger 
& Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) and quality of growth (Asongu & Rangan, 2015) 
studies.  Therefore, the techinque enables us to examine  the effects of social spending (health 
and education) on quality of growth with particular emphasis on  best- and worst-performing 
developing countries in terms of growth quality. 
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The  th quantile estimator of growth quality is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (1) for the purpose of 
simplicity and readability.   
   





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 
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k
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i
R
xyxy
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)1(min
                                             (1)
 
 
Where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example the 10
th
 or 25
th
 quantiles (with  =0.10 or 0.25 respectively) by approximately 
weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of growth quality or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (2) 
 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of ‘quality of growth’. For Eq. (2) the dependent variable 
iy  is the quality of growth indicator while ix  contains: a constant term, health spending, 
educational spending, government stability, inflation, credit, FDI, remittances, foreign aid, 
rule of law and quality of bureaucracy.  The empirical evidence is based on data with five 
year averages, for the most part.  
While the growth categories are provided by Mlachila et al. (2014), our estimation 
approach also enables us to classify the sample into three categories based on quantiles. With 
Quantile Regressions, low quantiles indicate countries with low values in the dependent 
variable while higher quantiles indicate countries with higher values in the dependent 
variable. Therefore, by dividing the sample into nine quantiles, the three distinctions in 
Mlachila et al. (2014) can be emphasised by our estimation technique. 
 
3. Empirical results 
The empirical results are presented in Table 2. Increasing the conditioning information 
set is a form of testing if baseline regressions withstand further empirical scrutiny when more 
factors are accounted for. Two control variables are used in the first specification, before 
more are used in the second specification. This discussion is provided here in Section 3. 
Conditional distributions are divided into three main categories to articulate Hopefuls (0.10, 
0.20 & 0.30), Contenders (0.40, 0.50 & 0.60), and Best performers (0.70, 0.80 & 0.90) in 
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terms of growth quality.  Two main specifications are provided: the first with a limited 
conditioning information set (or control variables) and the second with more control variables 
to assess robustness of baseline estimations. 
The following findings can be established from the first specification. First, health 
spending has a positive threshold effect with decreasing magnitude across the whole 
distribution from the 0.10
th
 to the 0.80
th
 quantile. Second, as for the impact of educational 
spending, there is a positive threshold effect with increasing magnitude in each quality of 
growth category. In other words, there is a positive increasing magnitude from: (i) 0.10
th
 to 
the 0.30
th
 quantile (Hopefuls); 0.40
th
 to the 0.60
th
 quantile (Contenders) and 0.70
th
 to the 0.90
th
 
quantile (Best Performers). Overall, when averages of the categories are compared, the effect 
of education has a positive threshold effect with increasing magnitude from Hopefuls to 
Contenders. It is important to note that the assumption of quantitative significance between 
Hopefuls and Contenders rests on the estimation technique that distinguishes countries in 
terms of initial levels in quality of growth. The positive effects from education and health 
spending are consistent with the positive effect of social spending in Mlachila et al. (2014). It 
is important to also note that we have decomposed social spending into its health and 
education components. Third, on the control variables, while inflation has the expected sign, 
government quality has the expected effect only in the 0.10
th
 quantile. However, the 
magnitude of the latter control variable is low.  
In the second specification, the following can be established. First, health spending has 
a positive threshold effect with decreasing magnitude across the whole distribution from the 
0.10
th
 to the 0.60
th
 quantile. Conversely, there is a threshold positive effect with increasing 
magnitude among Best Performers (0.10
th
 to the 0.90
th
 quantile). Second, on education 
spending: while there is a positive effect with inverted U-shaped tendency among Hopefuls 
and Contenders, the corresponding positive effect is U-shaped among Best Performers. 
Overall, when averages of categories are compared, education has a positive threshold effect 
with increasing magnitude from Hopefuls to Contenders. Third, most of the significant 
control variables have the expected signs. While government quality, private credit and 
quality of bureaucracy have positive effects, the impact of remittances is negative. The 
positive effects of government quality and private credit are consistent with Mlachila et al. 
(2014). 
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Table 2: Conditional effects of health and education spending   
          
 Specification 1 
          
 Hopefuls Contenders Best Performers 
    
 Q.10 Q.20 Q.30 Q.40 Q.50 Q.60 Q.70 Q.80 Q.90 
          
Constant  0.164*** 0.191*** 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.226*** 0.235*** 0.247*** 0.278*** 0.288*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Health Spending 0.370*** 0.362*** 0.340*** 0.334*** 0.331*** 0.320*** 0.314*** 0.290*** 0.295*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Educational Spending 0.258*** 0.259*** 0.274*** 0.272*** 0.274*** 0.280*** 0.278*** 0.282*** 0.293*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Stability   0.000006** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000006 
*** 
-0.000008 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
-0.00002 
*** 
 (0.037) (0.961) (0.314) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation (ln) -0.002 -0.005** -0.004** -0.004 -0.005*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.006** -0.008** 
 (0.409) (0.028) (0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024) (0.014) 
          
Pseudo R² 0.779 0.790 0.794 0.786 0.772 0.756 0.736 0.704 0.667 
Observations  283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 283 
          
          
 Specification 2 
  
 Hopefuls Contenders Best Performers 
    
 Q.10 Q.20 Q.30 Q.40 Q.50 Q.60 Q.70 Q.80 Q.90 
          
Constant  0.109** 0.121*** 0.117 0.148*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.210*** 0.218*** 0.199*** 
 (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Health Spending 0.375*** 0.347*** 0.334*** 0.318*** 0.302*** 0.288*** 0.298*** 0.301*** 0.319*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Educational Spending 0.245*** 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.252*** 0.267*** 0.266*** 0.278*** 0.274*** 0.285*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government Stability   0.002 0.002 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.421) (0.314) (0.034) (0.003) (0.003) (0.026) (0.328) (0.232) (0.374) 
Inflation (ln) 0.002 0.0005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006 
 (0.738) (0.908) (0.135) (0.105) (0.204) (0.230) (0.495) (0.627) (0.216) 
Credit (ln) 0.009* 0.015** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.006 0.0006 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.065) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.204) (0.941) (0.878) (0.837) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.001 -0.0001 0.00001 0.00006 -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0009 
 (0.501) (0.943) (0.991) (0.947) (0.752) (0.575) (0.888) (0.928) (0.716) 
Remittances  -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.0006 -0.001 -0.002** -0.003** 
 (0.532) (0.448) (0.233) (0.097) (0.060) (0.389) (0.163) (0.021) (0.016) 
Foreign Aid  0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 (0.471) (0.821) (0.767) (0.727) (0.662) (0.548) (0.553) (0.874) (0.898) 
Rule of Law  0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.0006 0.0001 0.002 0.004 
 (0.234) (0.707) (0.514) (0.428) (0.576) (0.817) (0.978) (0.555) (0.485) 
Bureaucracy  0.002 0.0003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.002 
 (0.746) (0.957) (0.745) (0.329) (0.306) (0.084) (0.404) (0.449) (0.732) 
Pseudo R² 0.846 0.833 0.831 0.830 0.824 0.812 0.796 0.777 0.755 
Observations  147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 147 
          
***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Growth  
is least. Ln: logarithm.  
 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
We have observed from the above that, but for some slight exceptions in the findings of 
Specification 2, the results of Specification 1 are broadly consistent with those of 
Specification 2. The exceptions include: (i) the Best Performers category for health spending 
and (ii) shapes of all categories in the positive effects of education spending. In a situation of 
conflict of interest, while it would be logical to give preference to the findings of 
Specification 2 because it entails more control variables, in average terms, the findings of 
both specifications are consistent, notably the effect of health is decreasingly positive from 
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Hopeful, Contenders to Best Performers while the impact of education is increasingly positive 
in the same chronology of categories. Such differences in effects may be traceable to the fact 
that education is comparatively more rewarding for quality of growth in high quality of 
growth countries, while health spending leads to comparatively higher returns in quality of 
growth in low quality of growth countries. Any attempts at explaining why such differences 
occur may only be speculative. Such elucidation could be an interesting area of future 
research.  
 It should be noted that almost all countries in the Hopeful category are from SSA 
(with the exceptions of Yemen and Pakistan). It follows that it would benefit countries in the 
sub-region to invest more in health relative to education now, but decrease health spending 
and increase education spending respectively relative to education spending and health 
spending  as the economies in the sub-region make the transition from Hopeful to Contenders 
and finally to Best Performers in terms of ‘quality of growth’.  In other words, the health 
elasticity of ‘growth quality’ is a decreasing function of ‘quality of growth’ whereas education 
elasticity of ‘growth quality’ is an increasing function of ‘quality of growth’.  
 Overall, we have shown that blanket welfare policies on social spending aimed at 
boosting ‘quality of quality’ may not be effective unless they are contingent on performance 
in growth quality and hence tailored differently across Hopefuls, Contenders and Best 
Performers. This implies policies meant to improve growth quality across in SSA should be 
different from those of more advanced developing countries in growth quality. Moreover, the 
findings also have implications for medium- and long-term planning when it comes to the 
social spending needed to increase the much needed ‘quality of growth’. This planning 
dimension is relevant for the post-2015 Sustainable Development agenda.  
 Accordingly, this study has been motivated by the transition from the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that has substantially 
shifted the policy debate from growth to ‘quality of growth’ (QG). The April 2015 World 
Bank publication on MDGs extreme poverty targets has revealed that poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). We 
have explored a new dataset on QG by the IMF and classified 93 developing countries for the 
period 1990-2011 in terms of Hopefuls, Contenders and Best Performers. Preliminary 
findings reveal that 31 of the 33 countries in the Hopefuls category are in SSA.  
We have built on stylized facts depicting the contradiction between high-growth and 
poor welfare spending and assessed determinants of education and health spending on the QG 
using quantile regressions to articulate least and best performers. It is important to note that  
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‘welfare spending’ does not include only health and education but that it also includes 
pensions and other social transfers. Hence, there is a specific part of social spending that is 
not included in the analysis. The following findings have been established.   First, on average, 
the effect of health (education) is decreasingly (increasingly) positive from Hopeful to Best 
Performers. Second, within categories (1) health spending has positive threshold effects with 
decreasing magnitude among Hopefuls (0.10
th
 to 0.30
th
 quantiles) and Contenders (0.40
th
 to 
0.60
th 
quantile), and the positive effects with increasing magnitude among Best Performers 
(0.10
th
 to 0.90
th
 quantile) and (2) education spending has  a positive inverted U-shaped effects 
among Hopefuls and Contenders and positive U-shaped effects among Best Performers..  
Policy implications have been discussed. The study which partially elucidates SSA’s 
extreme poverty tragedy is timely and relevant for the post-2015 inclusive and sustainable 
development agenda. There is evidently room for further research on (i) comparative country-
specific case studies and (ii) other welfare variables, for more focused policy implications. 
Further research can also use interactive regressions to assess whether low social spending is 
beneficial to low performing countries while high social spending is beneficial to high 
performing countries. This recommendation is consistent with a discovery by Harding and 
Lamarche (2014) that smaller classes are beneficial for low performers and larger classes are 
beneficial for high performers.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
 
Quality of Growth 
Index (QGI) 
“Composite index ranging between 0 and 1, resulting from the 
aggregation of components capturing growth fundamentals and from 
components capturing the socially-friendly nature of growth. The 
higher the index, the greater is the quality of growth” (p. 25). 
 
Mlachila et al. 
(2014) 
 
   
Educational 
Spending 
“Public resources allocated to education spending, as percent of GDP” 
(p. 25) 
IMF dataset 
   
Health Spending “Public resources allocated to heath spending, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
IMF dataset 
   
Government 
Stability 
“Index ranging from 0 to 12 and measuring the ability of government 
to stay in office and to carry out its declared program(s).The higher 
the index, the more stable the government is” (p. 25). 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG, 
2009) 
   
Inflation Inflation rate based on the Consumer Price  Index (CPI) World 
Economic 
Outlook 
   
Credit to private 
sector 
“Domestic credit to private sector, namely credit offered by the banks 
to the private sector, as percent of GDP” (p. 25).  
 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(WDI) 
  
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
“Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments, as percent of GDP” (p. 25) 
  
 
Remittances 
“Workers' remittances and compensation of employees (Percent of 
GDP), calculated as the sum of workers' remittances, compensation of 
employees and migrants' transfers” (p. 25).  
   
Foreign Aid “Official development Aid actually disbursed, as percent of GDP” (p. 
25) 
Guillaumont 
and Tapsoba 
(2012) 
   
 
Rule of Law 
“Index assessing the strength and the impartiality of the legal system, 
as well as the popular observance of the law. The index ranges from 0 
to 6, with a higher value of the index reflecting a higher institutional 
Quality” (p. 25). 
 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG, 
2009) 
  
Quality of 
Bureaucracy 
“Index of the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy, 
ranging from 0 to 4. The higher the index, the stronger the quality of 
the bureaucracy” (p. 25) 
   
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean S. D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
Quality of Growth Index (QGI) 0.604 0.140 0.258 0.849 372 
Educational Spending  0.612 0.263 0.000 1.000 372 
Health Spending 0.676 0.208 0.089 0.995 372 
Government Stability 18.518 165.55 2.666 2873.8 303 
Inflation (log) 2.331 1.358 -0.637 8.767 339 
Domestic Credit (log) 3.355 0.798 0.529 5.131 345 
Foreign Direct Investment 3.225 4.867 -4.172 62.264 366 
Remittances 4.117 7.391 0.001 63.295 322 
Foreign Aid 4.921 5.771 -9.546 36.317 226 
Rule of Law 3.290 1.060 0.666 5.933 301 
Quality of Bureaucracy 1.693 0.772 0.000 4.000 301 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Matrix  
            
Educ Health GovStab Infl(log) Credit(log) FDI Remit Aid Law Bureau QGI  
1.000 0.594 0.024 -0.007 0.152 0.048 0.419 -0.014 0.219 0.214 0.098 Educ 
 1.000 0.036 0.032 0.231 0.133 0.265 -0.070 0.214 0.228 0.340 Health 
  1.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.050 -0.046 0.160 0.355 0.025 -0.119 GovStab 
   1.000 -0.103 -0.111 -0.058 0.088 -0.100 -0.071 -0.003 Infl(log) 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.018 -0.230 0.235 0.464 0.551 Credit(log) 
     1.000 0.134 -0.062 0.130 -0.069 0.038 FDI 
      1.000 -0.027 -0.040 -0.058 -0.033 Remit 
       1.000 -0.059 -0.304 -0.572 Aid 
        1.000 0.256 0.352 Law 
         1.000 0.493 Bureau 
           QGI 
            
Educ: Educational Spending. Health: Health Spending. GovStab: Government Stability. Infl: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Remit: Remittances. Aid: Foreign Aid. Law: Rule of Law. Bureau: Bureaucracy. QGI: Quality of Growth Index.  
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